The history of football tactics is a saga of relentless evolution, where new waves stantly crash against and supersede the old.

  Old innovators eventually became mainstream and were repced by a new wave of innovators, promoting the tinuous development of football tactics.

  At the turn of the tury, many fans will remember the madness of the Bundesliga, Florentino's Galáaer United's Treble, and the afterglow of Serie A's World Cup success.

  However, few fans remember a small, less spicuous team that reached the Champions League final for two secutive seasons.

  Although they ultimately lost to giants and became synonymous with tragiear-misses, this team was undoubtedly the most impressive at the turn of the tury and pyed a crucial role as a tactical innovator in European football.

  This team was Valencia from La Liga.

  From Italian coach Ranieri, whht the Italian defensive framework to the team, tentine coach Héctor Cúper, who took Valencia's achievements further.

  Many fans remember Cúper for his time at Inter Min, especially his feud with Ronaldo.

  servative, stubborn, and impersonal—these are the stereotypes most fans have of Cúper.

  Even when Gao Shen searched for Cúper online before, a picture of an old-fashioned man with white hair, bck-framed gsses, and a stubborn expression always came up, deepening this perception for future geions.

  But iy, whether coag Real Mallorca or Valencia, Cúper was a geactical innovator.

  On the foundation id by Ranieri, he created a 4-4-2 diamond midfield formation for Valencia, which greatly influehe tactical development of European football.

  Cúper's style not only helped Valencia reach the Champions League final for two secutive seasons but also cultivated a group of outstanding pyers, such as Gerard and Mea.

  This approach won him the favor of Inter Min president Moratti, leading to his eventual feud with Ronaldo.

  So, was Cúper's tactical innovation merely an adjustment of pyer positions?

  To ordinary fans, it might seem so, but iy, it was a revolution in tactical cepts. It represented a signifit step forward in European football from the inal man-marking tactics to the zonal defense cept outlined by Sacchi.

  In the past, football tactics emphasized the possession of the ball and marking oppos, but now a third element had been added: space.

  In possession, the aim was to expand space as much as possible, move the oppo's defense, and create more offensive opportunities; in defe was about pressing space, maintaining a tight defensive formation, and redug the exposure of one's own space.

  As a single defensive midfielder, Gerard thrived under Cúper's system and was highly regarded by Bara, leading to his experansfer. However, he struggled at Camp Nou.

  Mea also moved to Lazio ter, experieng great disfort, and his career plummeted.

  This was definitely not a ce.

  If Cúper led the tactical revolution in Europe while coag Valencia, then his successor, Beook these innovations a step further, making them a sensus across Europe and the world.

  4-2-3-1, double pivot, high pressing!

  Benítez reized that a single defensive midfielder in the 4-4-2 diamond was insuffit to protect the space between the back line's fnks. With many European pyers like Zidane and Nedvěd excelling at attag these areas, he removed a striker and adopted a double pivot. After Valencia sold Gerard, he introduced Baraja and promoted Albelda, f one of the most cssic double pivot binations in European football over the past decade.

  With four lihe trol of space reached new heights. They could attack up front and defend ih. Benítez used this style to lead Valencia to the La Liga title and Liverpool to the Champions League miracle in Istanbul.

  Even in 2007, Liverpool would reach the Champions League final again.

  The 4-2-3-1 system was very adva the time.

  From the perspective of 2006, the 4-3-3 formation used by Chelsea's coach, Jose Mourinho, is very advanced, but it pces high demands on pyers and is not suitable for most teams. Typically, only strong teams employ it effectively. Oher hand, the 4-2-3-1 formation is different; its universality is very strong.

  At the very least, the current Real Madrid ot py a 4-3-3.

  Real Madrid oried to py with a double pivot in midfield.

  Florentino Pérez brought in Makelele, Fvio, and Cedes in one go—three defensive midfielders who had performed very well in La Liga. Later, pyers like Gravesen and Pablo Garcia were brought in, all famous in their ht. However, Real Madrid's defense remained poor. Why?

  The answer is simple: superstars.

  So, why do superstars have such a signifit impa Real Madrid's tactics?

  Is it just because the superstars aren't actively involved in defense?

  Yes, but that's not the whole story.

  It is now 2006, and the World Cup in Germany is approag.

  Many fans may wonder: why did Zidane perform so well in the World Cup in Germany but not as well in Real Madrid?

  Did he deliberately hold back at the club?

  Only Zidane knows for sure if he held back. However, Zidane pyed a pletely different role at Real Madrid pared to the Frenational team.

  In the World Cup in Germany, France adopted a 4-2-3-1 formation with Makelele and Vieira as the defensive midfielders. Zidane pyed as an attag midfielder rather than on the left side of the front line.

  The 4-2-3-1 formation is very banced, especially in terms of maximizing the role of the attag midfielder. Zidahrived in this tactical system and did not o worry about defending because he had two defensive midfielders behind him.

  It be said that this system allowed Zidao fully utilize his strengths.

  Could Real Madrid employ this formation?

  paring France's World Cup lio Real Madrid's, the striker would be Ronaldo versus Henry, the left side Raul versus Malouda, and the right side Robinho versus Ribery. It doesn't seem unfeasible, right?

  Even in midfield, Gravessen is a well-known Premier League pyer, Pablo Garcia is renowned in La Liga, and Beckham is an excellent long passer. It's worth a try.

  Then why didn't Real Madrid try it?

  The answer is still simple: the superstars!

  Firstly, Ronalde and abilities are not what they used to be, and he 't provide the same threat as Henry. Sedly, Roberto Carlos loves to attad is best at overpping on the wing. Everyone knows that for Carlos to be effective, the front line o leave space for him.

  The problem arises when oves forward; the pyers on the left side of the front line shift inward, encroag oag midfielder's space. If this were the only issue, it might be manageable. However, when Carlos's forward runs don't result in successful attacks and the oppos terattack, Real Madrid struggles tanize an effective defensive system.

  Real Madrid still employs the old zonal marking approach, fog more on individual pyer performaher than a cohesive team defense. Because Carlos 't always return to his defensive position, and because superstars like Ronaldo, Zidane, and Robinho are not actively defending, the system fails.

  If one or two pyers fail to track back, the team might pensate. But when multiple front-line pyers don't defend, how the team pensate?

  Thus, Real Madrid's defense has been riddled with holes for years. Even with ges in defenders and multiple purchases of defensive midfielders, there's been no improvement.

  The defensive system remains unged, the overall tactical cept remains unged, and sing pyers is futile.

  …

  Gao Shen is acutely aware of the problems Real Madrid is fag now.

  Before, as a fan, he only khe problem was with the superstars but didn't uand why.

  Now, he has a better uanding and is ready to address it.

  He chose to study Benitez's series of books, fog oez's tactid team formation, especially the improvements he made at Valencia and the transformations he executed at Liverpool. These were very valuable fao Shen.

  After spending nights in the library studying these cases, although there were still many things he didn't fully grasp, his uanding of tactics had reached a new level, and he could see Real Madrid's current problems more clearly.

  Real Madrid is in a dire state.

  This situation o longer be remedied with minor adjustments; it requires major surgery.

  Especially in defehe entire defensive system must be overhauled.

  Without innovating the defensive system, introdug more superstars will be useless.

  From Samuel to Woodgate, and the potential acquisition of world-css pyer avaro, even hiring the servative Italian coach Capello, who improved Real Madrid's defense and won the league championship, stability was still an issue.

  Capello's success at Real Madrid was due to his use of a double pivot.

  This is exactly what Gao Shen intends to do.

  Real Madrid's issue has never beeack but the defense.

  Or rather, how to better ahe defense while maintaining offehreats.

  Real Madrid is not short of good pyers. Gravesen, for example, was the core of Everton's midfield. While many think of him as a reckless pyer, he actually possesses strong passing and pymaking skills.

  Pablo Garcia is also a well-known pyer in La Liga. His ability to catch Real Madrid's eye is a testament to his strength.

  Gao Shen's task now is to formute suitable tactics to ie these pyers into a cohesive unit.

  The 4-2-3-1 is the tactic Gao Shen wants. He believes it is the most suitable formation for Real Madrid at the moment.

  Although this will sacrifie attag power, it will provide a solid defense, making Real Madrid more petitive.

  Moreover, since Gao Shen has decided to csh with the superstars led by the Brazilian ti, the team's offense will be affected anyway. It's better to proactively weaken the offense and strehe defense.

  After deg oactics, the step is to select the lineup.